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DILUTION AND COMPETITION NORMS: THE
CASE OF FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION
CLAIMS AGAINST DIRECT COMPETITORS
Shubha Ghosht
Abstract
The field of intellectual property can be understood as a system of
regulation governing the competitive process. A study of recent
trademark dilution cases suggests that competition norms inform the
dilution analysis. Thus, this article uses the example of trademark
dilution to demonstrate that intellectual property can truly be viewed
as competition policy.
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I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS COMPETITION POLICY
What is in a name? When it comes to legal categories, perhaps
everything. In 1998, Foundation Press published the Fifth Edition of
Professors Kitch and Perlman's casebook for a survey course on
intellectual property entitled "Intellectual Property and Unfair
Competition."' Notably, the title of the Fifth Edition had been
changed from "Legal Regulation of the Competitive Process," 2 the
name the book bore since the First Edition published in 1972. The
structure of the book, however, remained the same. The content had
been updated, but the new title marked a watershed in how the field of
copyrights, patents, trademarks, and related doctrines would be
labeled and packaged.
A large point of this article is that the title of the first four
editions of Professor Kitch and Perlman's book was accurate.3 The
field we call intellectual property is more appropriately understood as
a system of regulation governing the competitive process. The details
of this article, part of a larger project on intellectual property as
competition policy, demonstrate why that assertion is true and why it
matters, with a focus on the doctrine of dilution.4 The structure of my
argument is as follows. Part II identifies four competition norms that
inform the field of intellectual property. Part III applies these norms
to trademark law with a specific focus on the dilution cause of action.
Part IV, finally, applies the theory to the case law to show how
thinking of trademark law in terms of the identified competition
norms helps to assess trademark policy. Part V concludes with a
summary of the major points of my article. My goal in this paper is
not to change the name of the field, but to inform the label with a
deeper understanding of what is at stake in the doctrinal and policy
battles over copyright, patent, trademark, and the rest.
1. EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter KITCH & PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION].
2. EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
COMPETITIVE PROCESS (1972) [hereinafter KITCH & PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
COMPETITIVE PROCESS].
3. Id.
4. See generally 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007) (codifying the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006).
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II. FOUR COMPETITION NORMS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Intellectual property is often understood in opposition to antitrust
and competition policy.5 Trademarks, copyrights, and patents are
sometimes described as monopolies, exceptions to the norm of
competition and free trade.6 Conceptually, antitrust and competition
policies are viewed as fields outside of intellectual property, arising to
limit the protections of intellectual property when they interfere
inappropriately with free markets.7 In Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft,8
the United States Supreme Court addressed the preemptive effect of
intellectual property on state statutes that prohibited certain molding
processes for copying boat hulls. The Court, in ruling that such state
statutes were preempted, repeatedly referred to intellectual property,
specifically patents and copyrights, as Congressionally defined
limitations to free trade and free competition in ideas.9 The Court's
language, read narrowly, reinforces the polarization of competition
and intellectual property. 10
But to view intellectual property as the opposite of competition
is misleading. This view creates a binary opposition that confuses and
ignores the realities of intellectual property law in action, and
misleads the formulation of intellectual property and antitrust policy.
Intellectual property is as much about competition as antitrust law.
While antitrust law, for the most part, deals with traditional price
competition, where firms fight over market share through offering
customers the best collection of goods or services, quality, and price,
intellectual property deals with different types of competition. There
is competition, as recognized and criticized in the literature, in the
form of the race to be the first to invent or create a novel or original
work. There is competition in the form of the race to be the first to
market the work. There is also competition over uses of a given
technology or markets for products or services enabled by the
5. See generally id.
6. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 (1995), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/0558.pdf; Glynn S. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 367
(1999) (providing an academic discussion of intellectual property and monopolies, specifically
trademark and monopolies).
7. See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (noting that intellectual proper rights do not confer a privilege to violate antitrust laws).
8. Bonito Boats, Inc., v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
9. Id. at 156-57 (noting that the efficient operation of the patent system depends upon
free trade in ideas and unpatented inventions).
10. Id.
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technology. In short, to juxtapose intellectual property against free
trade and free competition is to ignore both the ways in which
competition informs intellectual property law and the different forms
that competition can take.
One way to remedy this mischaracterization is to focus on
market structure. This has been the tactic of some scholars,
particularly Professor Christopher Yoo, borrowing from the
economics literature on industrial organization." Professor Yoo's
strategy is to recognize that markets defined by intellectual property
rights (such as copyright) tend to have a structure distinct from that of
perfect competition, which is defined by the entry and exit of firms
responding to price signals.' 2 For example, Professor Yoo has shown
that a monopolistic competition market structure can be fitted to
copyright-based markets for information products. 13 This market
structure is useful in rationalizing intellectual property rights and
assessing the policy of intellectual property reform.14 Professor Yoo
has also argued that the literature on impure public goods shows that
alternative market structures can be used to define and organize
markets for different types of products and services protected by
intellectual property law. 15 This strand of scholarship recognizes that
intellectual property is about competition, but defines competitions in
terms of canonical forms of market structure. 16
Understanding competition in terms of market structure is
helpful, but also potentially limiting. Professor Yoo's scholarship
shows that it is possible to construct an intellectual property based
market that resolves the appropriability problem created by the non-
rivalry and non-excludability of information and yields close to
efficient allocation of resources.' 7 But just because something is
theoretically possible, does not mean that it is implementable or even
desirable from the perspective of social policy. Furthermore, what is
shown to be possible can also be conceptually misleading. To think in
terms of a particular market structure is to ignore the realities of
actual business transactions and social interactions. There is a danger
11. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
212 (2004).
12. ld. at 236-41.
13. Id. at 264-66.
14. Id. at 267-71.
15. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood
Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 635 (2007).
16. See generally id.
17. See Yoo, supra note 11, at 272-76.
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that a model, useful in analyzing reality, may inadvertently distort that
reality. In fact, one can criticize the market structure approach to
competition on the same grounds as criticism of the structure-
conduct-performance school (SCP) of antitrust law, the paradigm that
guided antitrust policy by appeal to canonical market forms.18 The
SCP school ignored business realities and actual market transactions
in favor of a formalistic model of markets and competition.' 9
However, even if the market structure approach fails to provide a
definition of competition, it is helpful in acknowledging that
intellectual property is a species of competition law. We are left,
however, with the vexing question of what is competition? Professors
Kaplow and Shapiro raise this question as well in their analysis of the
"rule of reason" in antitrust law. 20 As is well known, the "rule of
reason" assesses business transactions under the antitrust laws based
on a comparison of their pro-competitive and anti-competitive
effects.21 As Kaplow and Shapiro point out, whether a transaction is
pro-competitive or anti-competitive depends on how one defines
competition. In antitrust law, competition is legally understood in
terms of process:
The view seems to be that competition consists of buyers and
sellers each deciding for themselves ... with whom they will deal
and on what terms. Independent decisions are a central feature of
competition, whereas groups (typically of sellers) who attempt to
impose some regime regarding the proper terms of dealing are
subverting the process.... Put another way, what is right is
essentially taken to be whatever is the outcome of the competitive
22process ....
What Kaplow and Shapiro describe can be labeled the "Hayek-
Friedman" view of competition after the economists Friedrich Hayek,
who viewed the market as an efficient means of sorting and
aggregating information of atomistic actors,23 and Milton Friedman,
18. See Shubha Ghosh, The Market as Instrument: A Response to Professor Harrison, 59
SMU L. REV. 1717, 1721-23 (2006) (critiquing the SCP approach and citing to literature).
19. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of
Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 52 (2000).
20. Id. at 54-58.
21. See. e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720
(2007) (describing the rule of reason).
22. Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust 55 (John M. Olin Center for Law,
Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 575, 2007), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/.
23. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM 72-73 (1944).
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who defined market competition in terms of freedom of choice.24 As
Kaplow and Shapiro point out, however, this is not the only view of
competition studied by economists that would be applicable to
antitrust.25 Much economic study of markets focuses on behavior and
structural constraints on the demand and supply of the market that
result from the structure of information and production and
consumption decisions.26 Consequently, economists care less about
the meaning of competition than the interactions of individual firms
and consumers behaving under constraints.27
As applied to the field of intellectual property, this discussion of
competition might suggest that the Supreme Court is misguided in
creating an opposition between intellectual property and free
trade/free competition. Perhaps more to the point, intellectual
property, like other areas of law, governs the behaviors of individuals
by affecting the set of constraints under which individuals act. But the
prevalence of usage of the word competition in the case law suggests
that the concept cannot be so readily discarded.28 Furthermore, the
role of intellectual property in regulating certain industries as a
complement to antitrust law mandates that the concept of competition
needs to be confronted. This point is made stronger when we
recognize a commitment to competition as a normative matter,
whether in the form of advocating for freedom in the marketplace and
civil society more broadly or, at the international level, in the form of
a commitment to the free movement of goods and people, regulated
only for the pursuit of broader societal interests, such as health or
safety.
If competition cannot be satisfactorily defined, a workable
solution is to identify certain norms that inform meaningful and
recognizable competition. For example, one could define competition
as a free-for-all, the "all's fair" approach.29 Such an anarchic view of
competition, however, does not lend itself to legal or policy analysis,
24. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
25. See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 56.
26. See id
27. See id
28. See, e.g., William Kovacic, The Importance of History to the Design of Competition
Policy Strategy: The Federal Trade Commission and Intellectual Property Law, 30 SEATrLE U.
L. REV. 319, 332-35 (2007) (tracing the history of competition in intellectual property law and
policy).
29. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, Subversive Thoughts on
Freedom and the Common Good, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1813, 1819 n.14 (1999) (discussing market
anarchy).
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unless one adopts the view that policymakers should simply defer to
the outcome of unregulated competition. Such deference has typically
been avoided in the law, with very narrow exceptions. 30 Another
possibility is to define competition in terms of responses by potential
buyers and sellers of goods and services to price signals. This is
competition as experienced in the stock or commodities market, or in
a more refined way, at art auctions.31 We can think of this form of
competition as the "pit" model. While many markets are obviously
designed quite successfully along these lines, it would be misleading
to view competition solely in this way. Sometimes, competition may
occur with respect to quality or quantity, rather than price, such as
might occur in a market where prices are capped or prices are set by
some outside force, such as the global market for a particular precious
commodity like gold. This exercise, however, of analyzing different
forms of competition is helpful in identifying the different norms of
competition and in creating a general typology.
In a broader project of which this Article is a small part,32 I have
started to analyze the different types of competition that are
recognized in markets defined largely by intellectual property. In
creating this typology, I focus on competition among several groups.
First, there is rivalry among existing firms in a market as they vie for
a customer base and market share. Second, there is rivalry between
incumbent firms and potential entrants into a market. Finally, there is
rivalry between sellers and buyers of a product and service over terms
of the contract, such as price, quantity, quality, and the ability to use
the product or service that is the subject of negotiation. With these
rivalries in mind, I was able to identify several types of competition
norms that are often appealed to by courts. For the purposes of this
Article, I will simply appeal to this typology and will more fully
develop the links to the case law in subsequent research. I refer to
these four types as competition norms in order to emphasize that each
define a set of accepted rules about how competition is allowed to
30. See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE. L. J. 2331,
2391-95 (2003) (describing Lochner as a response to economic change and the accommodation
of law to regulation).
31. See Gideon Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 216 (2001) (describing an auction as an example of competition over
domain names).
32. See generally, Shubha Ghosh, Competitive Baselines for Intellectual Property
Systems, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 793 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman
eds., 2005).
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occur. As I explain in the rest of the Article, the challenge for
intellectual property is to understand when each norm or combination
of norms might be applicable to a particular problem. The four types
are labeled as follows:
(1) First Mover
(2) Controlled Entry
(3) Consumer centered
(4) Wealth maximization
Let me briefly explain each of these types. The remainder of this
paper will use this typology of competition norms to assess trademark
law and the dilution cause of action.
A. First Mover Norm
The first competitive norm is familiar from the common law
misappropriation cause of action. The idea is that the first to
appropriate an idea or the embodiment of that idea in a concrete form
is given the right to exclude others from access for some period of
time. In common law misappropriation actions, this right to exclude is
limited, in most instances, to "hot news," or information whose value
is time limited and requires costly effort to acquire. In intellectual
property law, the first mover norm arises in many forms. Copyright
law protects the author who fixes an original work of authorship
without copying from some other protected source. Patent law, in the
United States, protects the first inventor of a novel, nonobvious,
useful, and enabled invention. Trademark law, in the United States,
protects the first to use a distinctive mark in commerce that is able to
obtain registration. More broadly, property law recognizes many first
movers through appropriation and priority rules.33
For some scholars, the first mover norm is the dominant norm in
intellectual property law. 34 The norm justifies broad prohibitions
against free riding and unauthorized access to works protected by
intellectual property.35 Often, the first mover norm is stated in terms
of rent dissipation.36 While the first mover is given strong
exclusionary rights in the marketplace, the argument is that the
33. See, e.g., Leo Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitve Norm of
Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991).
34. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1031 (2005).
35. See id. at 1040-46.
36. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay 1. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78
VA. L. REV. 305, 307-08 (1992).
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competition is over the acquisition of the right. The race to acquire
the strong exclusionary rights dissipates any rents generated by
market exclusion and therefore the resulting allocation of resources
through the first mover norm is efficient.37 The rent dissipation
argument, as is well known, has been criticized because the race to
acquire rights as a first mover itself creates its own rents that may not
be dissipated and may in fact be captured by parties to the race.
Furthermore, the ex post exclusionary rights may create further
inefficiencies by preventing efficient uses of the protected asset by
follow-on inventors or consumers.38  These inefficiencies are
particularly likely in environments that are undergoing rapid
technological change. These arguments against rent dissipation call
into question the treatment of the first mover norm as a dominant
norm.
39
While the first mover norm may not be dominant, it serves an
important role in defining competition under some circumstances.
When property rights need to be defined in order to avoid the
commons problem, the first mover norm regulates competition over
who obtains initial entitlements. The first mover norm can also serve
to alleviate the anti-commons problem by concentrating ownership in
one individual or set of individuals with whom exchange can occur.4 0
The success of the first mover norm, however, rests on how the
entitlement over which the race occurs is defined ex ante and how the
rights acquired are enforced ex post. If the rights are defined too
broadly, then too many individuals may participate in the race and the
winner may be given too broad a right to exclude in the
marketplace.4' Similarly, too narrow a definition may not attract
enough participants in the race and can lead to an inefficient
allocation of the right.42 Finally, enforcement of the rights once
acquired is necessary to adequately define the boundaries of the right.
Too strong or too weak enforcement is as troubling as defining the
right too broadly or too narrowly.43
37. See id.
38. SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 133-34 (2004).
39. Id.
40. See Ghosh, supra note 32, at 795.
41. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 36, at 318.
42. See, e.g., id.
43. See, e.g., id.
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B. Controlled Entry Norm
Although the first mover norm has become for many scholars
and intellectual property policy makers the dominant norm of
competition, it is only one of four norms that can be identified in the
intellectual property case law. Under the first mover norm, entry is
largely at the behest of the owner of the intellectual property right.
Those who want to produce or use the protected product or service
have to do so with the permission of the rights holder. 4 Alternatively,
potential entrants into the market have to work around the rights
holder's entitlement, often with the threat of a law suit to determine
whether the rights have been transgressed. A strict application of the
first mover norm would tightly control the scope and extent of market
entry.
A controlled entry norm recognizes that some degree of market
entry should be permitted independent of the control of the rights
holder. At the extreme, the controlled entry norm would allow anyone
to enter the market for the intellectual property protected product with
only the lead time of the rights holder as offering a means to collect
rents.45 This extreme, of course, is the case made by Justice Stephen
Breyer in his famous article, "The Uneasy Case for Copyright. 'A6
According to Justice Breyer, publishers and authors can make their
money from books without copyright protection by selling advance
copies of the work and through product differentiation. A similar
argument could be made in the patent context with appeal to trade
secret protection, which for processes and for some products can
allow the rights holder to earn rents that can compensate for
investments in research and development. A more moderate version
of the controlled entry norm would allow entry only after the rights
holder has earned enough rents to adequately compensate for the
investments in' creating the protected work. For example, a
compulsory licensing scheme would be an example of this version of
the controlled entry norm. Finally, another version of controlled entry
would allow entry only to satisfy certain critical needs in the
marketplace, such as created by a medical or other emergency.
44. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.COM, Inc., 92 F. Supp.2d 349, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[F]or a copyrighterholder's 'exclusive' rights, derived from the Constitution
and the Copyright Act, include the right, within broad limits, to curb the development of such a
derivative market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the
copyright owner finds acceptable.").
45. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REV. 281 (1970).
46. Id.
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The norm of controlled entry recognizes two critical issues in
competition. The first is that entry, or at least the threat of entry, is the
essence of the competitive process. As analyzed by economists
William Baumol, Stephen Panzer, and Robert Willig, contestable
markets, ones in which, among other factors, entry costs are low, can
be as competitive as the perfectly competitive markets of economics
textbooks.47 But entry also cannot be unlimited without creating
problems for the competitive process. Excessive entry can be
destructive for the market, lowering prices to the point where
otherwise viable firms are driven out of the marketplace. In addition
to such destructive competition, excessive entry can lead to too much
diversity of choices for consumers and trivial variations in the
production and marketing of products and services. The norm of
controlled entry addresses the problems of excessive entry by limiting
the manner in which entry can occur without giving the rights owner
complete discretion in determining when entry occurs.
C. Consumer Centered Norm
The third norm of competition is a broader version of what is
sometimes referred to as consumer sovereignty, the view that the
consumers' values determine the efficacy of a market. While the
concept of consumer sovereignty is often based on the assumption of
a rationally acting consumer, the consumer centered norm recognizes
that the consumer may play different roles from that of a passive
purchaser of products and services. Perhaps a better description would
be user centered norm, but I will stick to the term adopted here
because of the connections with the important scholarly literature on
the consumer in intellectual property.
At the outset, this norm is distinguishable from the previous two,
which focused on the behavior of market participants, particularly
firms. The consumer centered norm seems to be result oriented,
describing a norm that would favor competitive processes that benefit
consumers over producers in the market. That conclusion is in part
misleading and stems from the view of the consumer as passive. To
the extent that the passive consumer is an accurate assessment, the
consumer centered norm would favor competitive processes that
would tend to lower prices for products and services protected by
intellectual property. That interpretation of the norm would have
47. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 43-44 (1982).
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implications for how one analyzed parallel imports, for example, with
a price focused consumer centered norm allowing parallel imports
even if they infringed on intellectual property rights. Even within the
framework of the passive consumer, however, the consumer centered
norm would in many instances also have to consider the quality of the
product or service, in addition to the price and the availability of the
product or service, absent adequate intellectual property protection.
One way to understand the consumer centered norm is to conceive of
the consumer as an agent who acts in the marketplace through voice,
exit and loyalty responding to the package of price, quality, and
quantity that the intellectual property owner provides. A consumer
centered norm would assess competition on its ability to meet the
needs of consumers as they express these needs through market
mechanisms.
Recognizing consumers as more than mere passive recipients of
goods who voice their wants through purchasing decisions, expands
the set of needs addressed by the consumer centered norm. For
example, suppose the consumer is also an inventor or creator who in
consuming products or services also produces new products or
services in the form of criticism or commentary or by tinkering with
existing devices or processes to generate improvements. Under this
view of the consumer, the consumer centered norm would design the
rules of competition to meet these needs which may result in
increased prices, but expanded dimensions of access. When the
consumer is conceptualized more broadly, the consumer centered
norm is not simply result oriented. The norm facilitates behavior that
is analogous to the entry of new firms. A consumer centered norm
constructs the consumer, determining what she is allowed to do
within the scheme of intellectual property.
Trademark law provides one example of consumer centered
norm, especially this norm in conflict with the first mover norm, as I
will elaborate in Section Three.48 Another salient example of the
consumer centered norm is the doctrine of fair use in copyright, which
allows consumers to infringe copyrighted works when the use is
productive and does not conflict greatly with the interests of the
copyright owner in potential markets for the work.49 While fair use
can be understood in some instances as an example of the controlled
entry norm, in situations involving new technologies (such as in the
48. See Jospeh P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397
(2003).
49. See id. at 403 (discussing copyright fair use doctrine).
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SONY or Grokster case) it is the consumer centered norm that is at
stake. 50 Recognizing copyright fair use as a type of consumer centered
norm helps to understand why there is no analogous doctrine in patent
law, emphasizing the first mover and controlled entry norms by
granting the patent owner strong exclusionary rights with narrow
exceptions for repair and for experimental uses. 51 Furthermore,
copyright fair use is very different from trademark fair use, which in
its traditional and nominative forms is an example of the controlled
entry norm, allowing the use of trademarked words for descriptive
purposes in the marketplace for language.
In conclusion, the consumer centered norm recognizes that
competition in the marketplace also exists between producers and
consumers. Any transaction involves the generation of surplus as the
purchaser must value the product or service at least as much as the
seller. The question is how this surplus is divided between the
purchaser and consumer through the terms of the transaction. A
consumer centered norm would favor competitive processes that
weigh in favor of consumers and would design rules that protect the
interest of consumers in market transactions.
D. Wealth Maximization Norm
The norm of wealth maximization would favor competitive
processes that maximize the aggregate wealth in society. Like the
consumer centered norm, this last norm seems result oriented. But
implicit in the norm is the transactional behavior of individuals in the
marketplace, each of which, if successfully completed, would
generate surplus as low valued products and services are transferred
to those who value them most. The wealth maximization norm seeks
to design competition so as to maximize the set of successful
transactions in the economy. Viewed simplistically, the fourth norm
might support creating a marketplace with many middlemen, each
generating some value and adding to the costs of transactions. But
such a simplistic conclusion would ignore that increasing the number
of intermediary transactions also would increase the costs of
transacting resulting in the possible shrinkage or even breakdown of
the marketplace. The norm then must be understood in terms of the
50. See Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of
Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (2007).
51. See Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005);
Sony Computer Entm't, Inc.v. Connectix Corp., 203 F. 3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
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aggregate market rather than in terms of the interests of one group,
such as intermediaries or producers.
Perfect price discrimination provides an example of the wealth
maximization norm and contrasts with the other three norms. When a
firm is able, through the existence of market power, to charge each
customer in the marketplace the most he is willing to pay for a
product or service, the firm is engaging perfect price discrimination.
Perfect price discrimination maximizes wealth because the firm is
able to sell the product or service to anyone willing to pay and collect
the maximum amount the customer is willing to pay. Therefore,
perfect price discrimination would satisfy the wealth maximization
norm of competition since the maximum possible voluntary
transactions in a marketplace can take place. However, perfect price
discrimination does not satisfy the consumer centered norm. Although
every consumer willing to pay is able to obtain the product or service,
the entire consumer surplus in the market is captured by the selling
firm. Furthermore, the controlled entry norm is not satisfied since
firms that may promote innovation in the marketplace are deterred
from entry. However, perfect price discrimination would satisfy the
first mover norm since the firm is able to capture rents in the
marketplace which can be used for additional investments in
innovation.
The wealth maximization norm in intellectual property is often
framed in terms of dynamic efficiency by structuring rules to generate
the creation of new products and services that are disseminated to a
wide range of consumers. This fourth norm overlaps with how
competition is viewed in antitrust law, which currently is guided by
goals of wealth maximization.53 In fact, when one thinks of the
tensions between intellectual property and antitrust law, the conflict
stems from how to apply the wealth maximization norm to markets
where exclusionary rights might interfere with the benefits of access
and potential transactions.54 For example, in cases involving
exclusionary conduct, where an intellectual property owner cuts off
access to products protected by intellectual property, courts are split
between creating an immunity for the intellectual property owner
from antitrust law and assessing on a case by case basis the
52. See U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 6, at 1-2.
53. See id.
54. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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consequences of exclusivity on wealth maximization.55  The
supporters of immunity are implicitly placing the dynamic efficiency
goals of intellectual property in generating new products and services
above the benefits of wealth generating transactions. 56 In other
antitrust-intellectual property cases involving contracting practices
such as ties or restrictions on use, courts and agencies have adopted a
"rule of reason" approach that requires a balancing of the pro-
competitive and anti-competitive effects.57 As Kaplow and Shapiro
point out, such a balancing requires a prior understanding of the
meaning of competition.58 The wealth maximization norm is the
strong candidate for how competition is understood in these cases.
This fourth norm is perhaps the most likely candidate for how
most individuals would think about competition. It is the norm that is
seemingly the most consistent with free trade or free competition with
its suggestion of anarchic dealing that is largely unregulated. But it is
only one of four identifiable competition norms. Arguably, it is the
norm that is best suited for understanding markets at a macro level
and one best suited for economies at a mature stage of development
where the norms of controlled entry and the consumer centered norm
may have been internalized in the behavior of firms and other market
actors. As a practical matter, the wealth maximization norm is biased
towards a deferential view of the market under which courts would
interfere rarely without evidence of harms to the maximization of
wealth. Unfortunately, this norm masks other ways in which
competitive norms operate, particularly the controlled entry and
consumer centered norms.
Having identified and described the typology of competitive
norms, I turn now to the question of how these norms are applicable
to particular problems of intellectual property. In the next section, I
demonstrate the role of these norms in the analysis of trademark law,
particularly the dilution cause of action.
55. Compare Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F. 3d 1288, 1295-96 (1 lth
Cir. 2004) (allowing prevention of free riding as a business justification for exclusionary
conduct and effectively creating an immunity), with Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1990) (scrutinizing intellectual property defense for
exclusionary conduct on a case by case basis).
56. See David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property and Antitrust:
General Principles, 43 IDEA 395, 428-30 (2003).
57. See U.S. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 6.
58. See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 55.
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III. COMPETITION NORMS iN TRADEMARK LAW
Minimizing consumer search costs is one justification for
trademark law. If products and services were not branded, consumers
would have to find some way to identify desired products. A brand
provides a cataloguing function that allows a consumer to determine
the type and quality of a product or service before purchase and to
find products or services with which there was a positive experience
in the past. Firms are willing to incur the expense of investing in
brands in order to secure a customer base, and consumers are willing
to pay the resulting higher price for a product or service in order to
save on search costs. Therefore, trademark law secures the
distinguishing function of brands through both the process of
acquiring trademark rights and enforcing them.59
The search cost story is one about competition between
consumers and sellers as well as about competition among sellers. As
between consumers and sellers, trademarks serve to reduce the
bargaining costs of negotiating terms of the contract that would secure
the quality of a product or service that might be required without the
information provided by the trademark. Although trademarks are not
a substitute for warranties, they can substitute for long term contracts
between a consumer and supplier. A consumer is willing to enter into
a discrete, short term contract for the purchase of a product or service
(a spot transaction) if the consumer knows that the product or service
can be found again in the future through the trademark. In addition,
trademarks affect competition among sellers as the brand is used to
attract customers to a particular source of a product or service. In this
way, trademarks do serve an advertising function, providing
consumers information about a product or service before the final
purchasing decision is made.
To understand how the four identified competition norms arise in
trademark law, these competitive forces need to be analyzed a bit
more thoroughly. Two contrasting stories about the market underlie
the search cost explanation. These two contrasting stories have
different implications for trademark policy.
59. For a theoretical background on trademark law, see Mark McKenna, The Normative
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007) (arguing that trademark
law did not traditionally protect consumers but producers from trade diversion). See also
Lunney, supra note 6, at 367 (grounding trademark law in a theory of competition); Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 1669 (2007); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism
in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1623-24 (2007) (expressing skepticism of the
trademark use doctrine and in favor of a case by case approach).
DILUTION AND COMPETITION NORMS
The first, which can be traced to George Stigler,6° views search
costs as largely one of investment in research and discovery by
consumers of the state of the marketplace. This investment has
spatial, temporal, and qualitative dimensions as consumers are
required to traverse a marketplace for the desired product or recall
previous purchasing decisions or investigate the qualitative
dimensions of a particular product. 61 Trademarks then serve as
shorthand to save on these investment costs. Once the consumer has
made them and identified and catalogued a product or service through
its brand, subsequent searches can be done with minimal or no cost.
The Stiglerian story contrasts with the story attributed to George
Akerlof that rests on information asymmetries in the marketplace.62
The familiar "Lemons model" can be understood by thinking of the
market as having high quality goods and low quality goods, which a
consumer cannot distinguish a priori but a particular seller can.
63
Since ex ante a consumer cannot distinguish between high quality and
low quality goods, the most that consumers would be willing to pay
for a good is the average price of high quality and low quality goods.
Since sellers of high quality goods would set a higher price than
sellers of low quality goods, sellers of high quality goods would
request a higher price than what consumers would be willing to pay.
Therefore, unless sellers of high quality goods can convince
consumers that their goods are truly of high quality, only low quality
goods would enter into the marketplace. Sellers of high quality goods
would need to signal that their wares are actually of high quality by
making investments that would be too expensive for sellers of low
quality goods. One way to do this is by including warranty terms in
the contract or by perhaps offering samples of the goods for free in
order to demonstrate their true quality. Another way is through using
some of the surplus that could be earned by selling their goods at a
higher price and investing it in advertising and branding. Therefore,
trademarks can signal high quality and help to reduce consumer
search costs in distinguishing among different grades of goods.
Which search cost story is more accurate has implications for the
competitive benefits of trademarks. Under the Stiglerian view,
60. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 215
(1961) [hereinafter Stigler, The Economics of Information].
61. Id.
62. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for"Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
63. Id.
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trademarks are a necessary convenience, allowing consumers to save
on costly investments in identifying and cataloguing products and
services. 64 The Akerlof story is somewhat more dire. 65 Absent
trademarks, and other legal devices, competitive markets might fail to
function or even fail to exist. Taking apart the search cost stories
reveals some of the criticisms of the search cost justifications for
trademark law. 66 The "Lemons" explanation implies that trademarks
just as likely serve to manufacture consumer demand as benefit
consumers in the search process.67 Critics of the search cost
explanation would view trademarks as a means of market
segmentation that facilitate practices such as price discrimination or
product differentiation.68 Although strict critics would condemn such
practices, such practices would be consistent with a wealth
maximization norm of competition. Nonetheless, the point still
remains that while the search cost explanation provides a seemingly
neutral or benign explanation of trademarks, the concern among
critics is that trademarks might serve the interests of producers more
strongly, or even at the expense of, the interest of consumers.69
Consumer search costs serve as a useful organizing principle for
trademark law that explains some of its features and underscore some
of the conflicts. The search explanation helps to identify the
competitive norms that inform trademark law. I would like to focus
on the two principal competitive norms in trademark law: the
consumer centered norm and the first mover norm. The consumer
centered norm follows from the search cost explanation. If trademarks
reduce consumer search costs, either under the Stigler or the Akerlof
approach, then consumer centered norms should inform trademark
70doctrine to ensure that legal rules are designed to benefit consumers.
But the search cost justification also requires consideration of the first
mover norm. In order to protect consumer interests, trademark law
needs to protect the companies that initially invest in the development
of distinctive brands. Under the first mover norm, trademark law
64. See generally George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J.
Bus. 117, (1964) [hereinafter Stigler, Public Regulation]; Stigler, The Economics of
Information, supra note 60.
65. See Akerlof, supra note 62.
66. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 59, at 1623-38.
67. See Akerlof, supra note 62.
68. E.g. Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to
Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 411-12 (1994).
69. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 59, at 1623-38.
70. See Stigler, Public Regulation, supra note 64; see generally Akerlof, supra note 62.
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should protect the rights of creators of distinctive brands who first use
them in a way that helps consumers in minimizing search costs in the
marketplace. For the rest of this Article, I will explore how the
consumer centered and first mover norms interact in the regulation of
competition through trademark law.
A clear example of the interaction of the consumer centered and
first mover norms in trademark law is provided by the likelihood of
confusion standard in an action for trademark infringement under
Section 1114 or Section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act. Such an action is
brought by a trademark owner, of either a registered or an
unregistered mark, against someone using the mark so as to cause a
likelihood of confusion among consumers. 71 A large point of
contention among legal scholars is likelihood of confusion as to what.
Cases speak of a likelihood of confusion as to source for a section
1114 action and a likelihood of confusion as to affiliation or
association for a section 1125(a) action.72 If the minimization of
consumer search costs is the accepted justification for trademarks,
then the confusion under either action should be one that exacerbates
the search behavior of consumers. This understanding implies a broad
basis for confusion and, consequently, a broad reach of the trademark
owner's rights.73 The Polaroid/Lapp/Sleekcraft factors that guide the
court's analysis in trademark infringement cases bespeak the breadth
of the trademark action and the scope of the trademark owner's
rights.74 These familiar factors allow the trademark owner to enjoin
and recover damages from a user of the mark even on products or
services that are outside the categories for which the mark is
registered and even with weak evidence of actual or potential
confusion among consumers.75
Further expansion of trademark owner rights has taken place
through trademark dilution. Until 1995, trademark dilution was a state
law cause of action in the United States that allowed the trademark
owner to enjoin uses of the mark that blurred or tarnished its
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2000).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a).
73. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 59, at 1623-38.
74. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961);
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,
599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979).
75. E.g., AMF, Inc., 599 F.2d at 353 (explaining that actual confusion is not usually
weighed as a heavy factor to find trademark infringement).
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reputation.76 While traditional trademark infringement was squarely
aimed at preventing consumer confusion, the dilution action has as its
target unauthorized uses that threaten to diminish or to lessen the
distinctiveness of a trademark. 7 Distinctiveness can be affected by
blurring the association of a mark with a particular product or service
or by tarnishing the status of a mark.78 When Professor Frank
Schechter first proposed the cause of action in his famous 1927
article, 79 he was primarily concerned with the effect of dilution on
consumer well-being while also acknowledging the potentially anti-
competitive effects of allowing a trademark owner to enjoin any use
of a similar mark on any product or service. In advocating the
creation of an anti-dilution cause of action, Professor Schechter
sought to address the effect of the loss of distinction of a mark on a
consumer's ability to use marks to discriminate among products and
services.8°
In terms of consumer search costs, the dilution cause of action
ideally serves to minimize consumer search costs. Specifically, the
cause of action serves to enjoin uses of a mark that may make it
difficult for consumers to determine the source of a product or service
by blurring the line among different product categories. 81
Furthermore, if dilution is allowed to occur through tarnishment,
marks become weaker as a means of distinguishing between high
quality and low quality products, potentially creating the "Lemons"
problem.82 Therefore, Professor Schechter was correct in pointing out
the problem of dilution and recommending a cause of action that
would complement traditional trademark infringement in order to
minimize consumer search costs.
83
76. See Kathleen B. McCabe, Dilution-By-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of
Trademark Infringement, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1855-56 (2000) (noting that prior to the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, passed in 1995, there was only a state cause of action for
dilution).
77. See Sarah M. Konsky, Publicity Dilution: A Proposal for Protecting Publicity Rights,
21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347,354 (2005).
78. See id.
79. Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927).
80. Id.
81. See Konsky, supra note 77, at 354.
82. See McCabe, supra note 76, at 1843. See also Akerlof, supra note 62 (discussing the
Lemon problem).
83. See Konsky, supra note 77, at 354 (discussing how blurring, and thus trademark
dilution, increases costs of consumer search and supports Professor Schechter's
recommendation for protection against it).
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The problem is that the dilution action and the weakness of the
likelihood of confusion standard act together to expand trademark
owner's rights without necessarily benefiting consumers. The concern
is that trademark owners bring trademark infringement and dilution
claims simply to appropriate rents in the marketplace without
generating benefits for consumers. Of greater concern is that these
transfers of rents may actually hurt consumers as certain benign and
beneficial uses of words and symbols that might enhance information
in the marketplace are enjoined. Thinking of these issues in terms of
competition norms, trademark law has moved towards the
strengthening of first mover norms at the expense of consumer
84centered norms.
Arguably, the consumer centered and first mover norms should
work together here to ensure that the trademark is not being
misappropriated in way that raises consumer search costs. In practice,
the action for trademark infringement strengthens the first mover
norm at the expense of the consumer centered norm. To the extent
that trademark law is used to enjoin or limit the use of the mark that
does not benefit consumers, the first mover norm can serve to transfer
rents from alleged misappropriators of brands to trademark owners
without any resulting benefits to consumers. Even worse, the transfer
may come at the expense of consumers who lose the benefit of certain
products or services that are being marketed. One solution to this
problem that has been suggested is to allow trademark law to enjoin
only trademark uses by the infringer. Within the consumer search
model, I take trademark use to mean uses that should serve to
minimize consumer search costs. The trademark use requirement
effectively would treat certain narrowly defined unauthorized uses of
a trademark as per se creating a likelihood of confusion by raising the
search costs of consumers in the marketplace. Put another way,
trademark use would make certain uses by the infringer per se non-
infringing because they do not affect consumer search costs.
While the proposal of trademark use has been scrutinized by
many scholars on both doctrinal and policy grounds, the proposal
provides a useful heuristic with which to formulate and assess ways to
limit the scope of trademark protection under current law. A useful
exercise is to attempt to define trademark use based on the analysis of
consumer search costs and competition developed in this Article. One
possible definition would define trademark use by an infringer as one
84. See Jonathan Mermin, Interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: The
Logic of the Actual Dilution Requirement, 42 B.C. L. REV. 207, 210 (2000).
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that would tend to raise the search costs of consumers. The problem
with this definition is that it blends the analysis of use by the infringer
with the likelihood of confusion analysis, something that advocates of
the proposal seek to avoid. However, the inability to separate the
issue of confusion from use may be a fatal flaw in the proposal.85
Another approach is to formulate the problem in terms of
competition more explicitly. Consider the problem of rationalizing the
dilution cause of action with traditional trademark infringement.
Under the terms of the consumer search model, companies are willing
to invest in trademarks in order to facilitate consumer search.
However, this investment entails competition with other firms.86 Use
of a similar trademark by an alleged infringer is problematic when (1)
the trademark owner may potentially enter the infringer's market, (2)
the alleged infringer may potentially enter the trademark owner's
market, or (3) entry is unlikely by either party but the alleged
infringer is taking advantage of the owner's mark. Each is
problematic because it raises the consumer's costs in searching for
particular products or services by making it more difficult to
distinguish among them. In these cases, the dilution cause of action
should be used to protect the rights of the trademark owner in order to
minimize consumer search costs. Trademark use could serve as a
limiting principle if use is understood in terms of either market
overlap between the trademark owner and the alleged infringer or in
terms of proximity of the infringer's mark to the owner's mark.
The third type of use described in the previous paragraph is
potentially problematic because it seems untethered from the market
in which the brand is used. Consequently, the third case is one which
could lead to an expansion of trademark rights on broad free riding
rationales. But to understand the third case, consider trademark claims
brought by an owner against a direct competitor. Arguably dilution
claims should be quite narrow in this context. When an alleged
infringer is a direct competitor, the main concern is one of confusion
by consumers. So a dilution claim makes sense to address non-
confusing uses of the mark that raise consumer search costs. Since the
owner and the alleged infringer are already in the same market, the
effect on consumer search costs cannot arise from the potential entry
of one seller into the other's market. Therefore, case three would be
the only one in which a dilution claim against a direct competitor
would be applicable. The problem with a direct competitor using a
85. See Mark McKenna, supra note 59, at 1841-42.
86. See idat 1841-44.
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trademark owner's mark in a non-confusing way, hence justifying a
dilution claim, is that the infringer is attempting to lower its costs of
production. The harm to consumers is that a firm is not incurring the
costs of investment in the creation of a distinctive brand that is
required to minimize consumer search costs. Notice that this type of
free riding in the dilution context is most likely when the owner's
market already serves a strong distinguishing function, that is, when it
is famous. Therefore, it is understandable why the dilution claim is
limited to famous marks.
To summarize, trademark use can be understood in terms of the
effect on consumer search costs. In the context of claims of confusing
uses of a trademark, it is impossible to separate the trademark use
determination from the likelihood of confusion analysis.
87
Nevertheless, with respect to dilution claims, trademark use can be
understood as either uses of a mark in a market that either the
trademark owner or the alleged infringer would intend to enter, or
uses of a mark that serve to minimize the alleged infringer's
investment in the development of distinctive brands. To test this
analysis, I examine trademark dilution cases involving claims against
direct competitors and assess how the courts apply the dilution
analysis. In looking at this pool of cases, I am looking for two factors
in cases in which the direct competitor was found liable for dilution:
(1) the infringer's minimizing its own costs of investing in brands and
(2) the effects of the infringement on consumer search costs.
IV. THE THEORY CONFRONTS THE CASE LAW
The thesis of this Article is that intellectual property should be
understood as form of competition policy. Adopting a broad notion of
competition, I illustrated how trademark law provides an example of
this thesis. Trademark law, I have argued, regulates rivalries between
suppliers and consumers and rivalries among suppliers by minimizing
the search costs of consumers that arise from problems of information
in the marketplace. In this section, the trademark case law provides a
set of examples against which to understand trademark law as
competition policy. Specifically, I consider dilution cases brought by
a trademark owner against a direct competitor to assess how
trademark dilution claims regulate competition. My goal is to assess
how well dilution claims in this context are able to police actions that
87. See generally id
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would tend to raise consumer search costs and endorse consumer
centered norms in trademark law.
Federal trademark dilution claims do not statutorily distinguish
between claims against competitors and non-competitors.8 8
Furthermore, dilution claims supplement claims based on consumer
confusion. The harm that dilution is designed to police is the loss of
the ability of a mark to distinguish among different products and
services, whether as a means of cataloguing and identifying
differences among products and services (in the Stigler sense) or a
means of signaling quality (in the Akerlof sense).89 This harm can
arise when a protected mark is used by either a competitor or a non-
competitor and is independent of any actual or potential confusion
suffered by consumers. Therefore, the statutory definition of dilution
is consistent with the competition based theory developed here.90 The
question I turn to in this section is whether the competition based
theory is consistent with the case law. Published cases do not provide
a pure experiment with which to test a theory. But comparing the
decisional law with the theory provides some glimpse into how
dilution claims are actually handled by the courts and how the theory
should be revised.
In August, 2007, I conducted a search of the federal appellate
court database on Westlaw of the term "Lanham Act' and (1125(c) or
43(c))." This search brought up 130 cases at the appellate level since
the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 1995 in which
these search terms appeared. Of these 130 cases, forty-nine contained
a substantive ruling on the antidilution claim. Of these forty-nine,
twenty-two cases involved a claim brought by a trademark owner
against alleged unauthorized use of the mark on competing products
or services. These cases were the ones designated as dilution claims
against competitors. Whether a product or service was determined to
be competing was a qualitative decision. For example, one of these
twenty-two decision was the Supreme Court's opinion in Moseley v.
V Secret Catalogue Inc., a claim brought by a seller of lingerie against
an adult bookstore owner where lingerie (among other items) were
sold.9' This case represents the outer edge of the meaning of directly
88. See generally 15 U.S.C § 1127 (2000) (providing statutory background).
89. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).;
Akerlof, supra note 62.
90. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West Supp. 2007).
91. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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competing. Table One summarizes the twenty-two cases that are the
analyzed in this section.
92
There are some preliminary conclusions worth mentioning about
these cases. Of the twenty-two cases, nine entailed a victory at the
appellate level for the trademark owner, meaning either a reversal of a
summary judgment for the alleged infringer or a denial of a
preliminary injunction.93 The remaining thirteen entailed a victory for
the alleged infringer.94 It would be difficult to conclude that the
federal claim favors trademark owners over alleged infringers or that
the claim is necessarily successfully used against competitors in the
marketplace. This is especially true when you consider that the
Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Moseley raised the standard for
trademark dilution claims by requiring the owner to show actual
dilution.95 In this admittedly limited sample, about half the cases in
which the infringer won were decided before 2003 when the circuits
were split on the standard for dilution. However, of the nine cases in
which the owner won, roughly five of the cases were decided after
Congress lowered the standard for dilution claims in favor of owners
in 2006. Of the cases in which the infringer won, only three of the
thirteen were after the change in the law in 2006. The relationship
between the change in the standard and the decisional case law needs
to be analyzed more closely, but the small sample here suggests that
the 2006 shift to a likelihood of dilution standard might lead to more
victories by trademark owners bringing antidilution claims.
To what extent do search costs help to inform these decisions? In
three of the cases where the owners experienced some type of victory,
consumer search costs, independent of confusion, can help to
understand the result.96 In Horphag, the court found in favor of the
trademark owner when a competitor in the herbal supplement market
used the exact same trademark ("Pycnogenol") in its package labeling
for a supplement. 97 In this case, both owner and infringer were
marketing the same product and the dispute was essentially over
which product was the genuine supplement in a market otherwise
92. See Table One, infra p. 600.
93. See Table One: Entries 1-9, infra p. 600.
94. See Table One: Entries 10-22, infra p. 600.
95. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 419.
96. Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007); Eli Lilly v.
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 461-63 (7th Cir. 2000); Times Mirror Magazines v. Las
Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 162, 170 (3d Cir. 2000).
97. Horphag, 475 F.3d at 1033, 1039.
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unregulated by food and drug laws.98 Similarly, in Eli Lilly v. Natural
Answers, Inc., the pharmaceutical company was able to enjoin use of
"HERBROZAC" which was similar to the familiar "PROZAC"
trademark as applied to a stress-relieving dietary supplement.99
Finally, in The Times Mirror decision, a competing newspaper's
unauthorized use of "The Sporting News" in the title of the
newspaper was the basis for a dilution claim. 100 In each of these cases,
the competitor's use of the mark could result in an increase in
consumer search costs in identifying products or services or in
distinguishing product quality. 10 The products at issue were ones in
which the sellers would have more information about the product than
the consumer (supplements) or in which the product is a strong
experience good that the consumer could only recognize after making
the purchasing decision (the newspaper). 10 2 Therefore, the trademarks
in these cases were serving a strong signaling function. The court's
decisions in favor of the owner can be additionally understood as
sanctioning the alleged infringer for not sufficiently investing in the
creation of stronger trademark signals in the marketplace.
Two other cases in which the owner won are more tenuous in
terms of effects on consumers, but can be understood in terms of
investments in brand creation. In the Starbucks case, the court found
potential dilution in a competing cafe's use of the mark "Mr.
Charbucks."' 10 3 It is hard to imagine that a discerning consumer would
find it difficult to distinguish between a Starbucks and a Charbucks
either in the Stigler sense of cataloguing different types of coffees or
in the Akerlof sense of discriminating between high quality and low
quality brands. A similar argument can be made when comparing the
"Hot Wheels" mark with the "Hot Rigz" mark, which was found to be
potentially diluting in the Jada case.104 Both of these cases, however,
can be understood as ones in which the court was concerned with the
lack of investment by the alleged infringer in developing new brands
that would serve a stronger distinguishing and signaling function.
The competition model can also help in understanding several
cases in which the infringer had a victory at the appellate level. In
98. Id. at 1032-33, 1036.
99. Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 459, 469.
100. Times Mirror Magazine, 212 F.3d at 161-62.
101. Horphag, 475 F.3d at 1037; Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 462-63; Times Mirror Magazine,
212 F.3d at 162.
102. Horphag 475 F.3d at 1037; Times Mirror Magazine, 212 F.3dat 162.
103. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, 477 F.3d 765, 766 (2d Cir. 2007).
104. Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 496 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Louis Vuitton, the court was convinced by evidence of differences in
the design and trade dress of competing handbags to find in favor of
the alleged infringer. 10 5 Similarly, in Playtex, the infringer's mark
"Moist Ones" was found not to dilute the owner's "Wet Ones."'
10 6
This last case is particularly noteworthy because of the way in which
the competitor was able to develop a mark that evoked the owner's
mark (moist evoking wet) but creating a different signal that
distinguished the one product from the other.'0 7 In another set of
cases, the court was very careful to analyze the geographic usage of
the mark as well as the particular usage of the mark by competitors in
finding against the owner. For example, in the Care First case, the
court distinguished the infringer's "First Care" mark both on the
grounds that it was used in a different geographic market and in a
distinctive way.' °8 The court also found different geographic markets
and usage in National Association for Healthcare Communications,
which involved competing uses of the mark "Carelink."' 10 9 Finally, in
Everest Capital, the court once again carefully analyzed the market
and the trademark use to find against the dilution claim.' 10
The dilution analysis is also informed by considerations of
product functionality and aftermarkets. Four cases expressly involved
product functionality and trade dress protection: Au-Tomotive
(automobile accessories),"' Converse (clothing)," 2 Syndicate Sales
(flower baskets)," 13 and IP Lund (faucets)." 14 The owner won in the
first three cases while the infringer had a victory in the fourth case. In
each of these cases, the court parsed the market effects of trade dress
protection, concluding that the trade dress served a strong signaling
function in the first three cases. This focus on market effects can also
be seen in what I label the aftermarket cases: Thane (stationary
105. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006).
106. Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2004).
107. Id. at 167 (noting the presence of "Quilted Northern" in the defendant's mark and
further noting that "Moist" and "Wet" do not appear or sound similar).
108. CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, 434 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2006).
109. Nat'l Assn. for Healthcare Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc.,
257 F. 3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 2001).
110. Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., 393 F.3d 755, 763 (8th Cir. 2005).
Ill. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.
2006).
112. Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc. v. Converse, Inc., 175 Fed. Appx. 672, 674 (5th
Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion).
113. Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 635 (7th Cir. 1999).
114. I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 32 (1 st Cir. 1998).
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exercise machines),'" 5 Nitro Leisure (used and refurbished golf
balls),' 16 and Connectix (gaming machines).' 7 In each of these cases,
the dilution claim was brought against a direct competitor who would
have measurable effects on the mark owner's market share. In Thane,
for example, the infringer's stationary exercise machines would have
affected the owner's market for recreational and exercise bicycles."l
8
Similarly, in Nitro Leisure, the infringer's used and refurbished golf
balls created a competing aftermarket for the mark owner's new golf
balls. 119 Finally, in Connectix, the infringer's gaming system would
directly substitute for the mark owners. 20 In each case, however, the
court denied the dilution claim partly out of consideration of the
consumer benefits created by these infringers through the
aftermarkets. '
21
Although a handful of these cases disposed of the dilution claim
on technical grounds, 122 all the rest illustrate how competitive norms
inform the dilution cause of action. 23 My point here is not to
conclude that the theory of competitive norms can rationalize or
predict all dilution cases. Rather, the analysis highlights how
115. Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002).
116. Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
117. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp, 203 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2000).
118. Thane Int'l, 305 F.3d at 898-99.
119. Nitro Leisure, 341 F.3d at 1358.
120. See Sony, 203 F.3d at 599.
121. See Thane Int'l., Inc., 305 F.3d at 894; Nitro Leisure, 341 F.3d at 1356.; Sony, 203
F.3d at 596.
122. See Doeblers' Pa. Hybrids Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 2006) (assignment
of mark and trade name); ICEE Distribs., Inc. v. J&J Snack Foods Corp., 325 F.3d 586 (5th Cir.
2003) (franchise agreement); Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d
1333 (Fed. Cir. 20003) (procedure for opposition); K'Arsan Corp. v. Christian Dior Perfumes,
166 F.3d 1214 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion) (memo disposition based on lack of
evidence of dilution or confusion).
123. See Thane Int'l, 305 F.3d at 894; Nitro Leisure, 341 F.3d at 1356.; Sony, 203 F.3d at
596; Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006); I.P.
Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire
Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999); Nat'l Assn. for Healthcare Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cent.
Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F. 3d 732 (8th Cir. 2001); Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority,
Inc. v. Converse, Inc., 175 Fed. Appx. 672 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion); Everest
Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., 393 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2005); Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006); Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
390 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004); CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, 434 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2006);
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007); Times Mirror
Magazines v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000); Horphag Research Ltd. v.
Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2007); Eli Lilly v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.
2000); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc.,
496 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
DILUTION AND COMPETITION NORMS
competition norms do play a role in the court's analysis and
disposition of cases. To the extent that the movement to a likelihood
of dilution standard, after the 2006 reforms, may bias the cases in
favor of trademark owners, the precedent shows that competition
norms can provide an important source of balance to the direction of
dilution claims. 24 More broadly, this small, but revealing, set of cases
demonstrate how intellectual property law itself functions as a form of
competition policy, as opposed to existing in opposition to the
competitive marketplace. 
25
V. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property is competition policy. This proposition was
recognized by Professors Kitch and Perlman when they launched their
1972 casebook. 126 The lesson seemed to be lost with the need to be
able to market the Fifth Edition of their book effectively in 1998.127
The lesson also seems to have been lost in the broader discourse on
intellectual property. This paper is a preliminary attempt to revive the
traditional thinking of intellectual property with the simple example
of trademark dilution. A study of some of the cases suggests that
competition norms do inform the case analysis despite all the talk of
property protection. Future research will show how competition
norms are ubiquitous in all the branches of intellectual property law.
This Article has suggested that the doctrinal debates over trademark
use, famous marks, niche markets, and geographic scope can be
understood with respect to competition norms. My broader project is
to show how these norms inform other doctrines such as fair use in
copyright, experimental use in patent, and the other intellectual
property levers. As I asked at the start of this Article, what is in a
name? Quite a bit, but more critical is understanding the normative
foundations of our legal structures, whatever label at the moment
happens to captivate us.
124. See cases, supra note 122-123.
125. See cases, supra note 122-123.
126. KITCH & PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS, supra note
2.
127. KITCH & PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra
note 1.
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TABLE I
DILUTION CLAIMS AGAINST COMPETITORS
Owner Alleged Infringer Circuit (Date) Trademarks
Cases in which there was a victory for trademark owner on federal dilution claimMttI Hot Wheels v Hot
Mattel Jada Toys 9th Cir. (2007) Rigs
2 Starbucks Wolfe's Borough Starbucks v.Coffee Charbucks
3 Horphag Research Garcia 9th Cir. (2007) Pycnogenol
4 Au-Tomotive Gold Volkswagen 9th Cir. (2006) Volkswagen & Audi
5 Alpha Kappa Alpha
Sorority Converse 5th Cir. (2006) GREEKPAK
6 Enterprise Advantage Fed. Cir. (2003) "Pick you up"
7 Eli Lilly Natural Answers 7th Cir. (2000) Prozac v Herbzac
8 Times Mirror Las Vegas Sports 3d Cir. (2000) The Sporting News
Magazine News
trade dress for
9 Syndicate Sales Hampshire Paper 7th Cir. (1999) baskes
Cases in which there was victory for alleged infringer on federal dilution claim
10 DoeblersPennsylvania Hybrids Doebler 3d Cir. (2006) DOEBLER
CareFirst vs.
II CareFirst of Maryland First Care 4th Cir. (2006) FirstCare
12 LouisVuitton Dooney & Bourke 2d Cir. (2006) design for handbagsMalletier
13 Everest Capital Ltd. Everest Funds 8th Cir. (2005) EverestManagement ________
14 Playtex Products Georgia Pacific 2d Cir. (2004) Wet Ones vs. MoistCorp. Ones
15 Acushnet Nitro Leisure Fed. Cir. (2003) TITLEISTProducts
16 ICEE Distributors J&J Snack Foods 5th Cir. (2003) ICEECorp.
Victoria's Secret v.
17 V Secret Moseley S. Ct. (2003) Victor's Little Secret
18 Trek Bicycle Thane 9th Cir. (2002) Trek vs. Orbitrek
National Assn for19 The Central Arkansas inlAsfo
Healthcare 8th Cir. (2001) CarelinkArea on Aging Communications
"Play Station" v.
20 SONY Connectix Corp. 9th Cir. (2001) "Virtual Game
Station"
21 I.P Lund Kohler 1st Cir. (1998) design of faucet
22 K'Arsan Corp Christian Dior 6th Cir. (1998) SUN POWDER
